Given a network that deploys multiple firewalls and network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs), ensuring that these security components are correctly configured is a challenging problem. Although models have been developed to reason independently about the effectiveness of firewalls and NIDSs, there is no common framework to analyze their interaction. This paper presents an integrated, constraint-based approach for modeling and reasoning about these configurations. Our approach considers the dependencies among the two types of components, and can reason automatically about their combined behavior. We have developed a tool for the specification and verification of networks that include multiple firewalls and NIDSs, based on this approach. This tool can also be used to automatically generate NIDS configurations that are optimal relative to a given cost function.
INTRODUCTION
Correctly configuring a network that includes multiple servers, routers, firewalls, and other security mechanisms is a challenging task, particularly when the intended properties are never defined, or only vaguely specified.
To address this problem, a number of methods for formalizing network configurations and policies have been proposed, together with tools for ensuring that a particular configuration satisfies a given policy specification [12, 13] . We build on this work, extending it by including specifications and requirements for the network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs). We can then reason about the combined effects of network topology, filtering, and NIDS placement and configuration. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to reason about joint NIDS and firewall configurations within a single formal framework.
A sample of the questions we want to answer is: For a given topology, NIDS, and firewall configurations, is a particular class of "bad" events always detected? Can false alarms be raised for a given set of "good" events? How should the NIDSs be configured to minimize false alarms, maximize the number of detected bad events, and minimize a given deployment cost?
The effectiveness of the proposed method, and the cost of applying it, must be considered. One of our goals is to produce a "lightweight" formal tool, whose cost ranges from minimal (a "one-click" sanity check of the network that will report inconsistencies, redundancies, and incomplete configurations) to moderate (automatically checking security policies specified by a designer).
As with any formal method, the guarantees that it provides are relative to the accuracy of the models and specifications, and the level of abstraction used. For example, we note that our IDS model does not characterize low-level NIDS behavior such as packet/stream reassembly and payload encoding normalization, used to counter NIDS evasion and denial of service attacks (e.g., [18] ). Instead, we assume that the NIDSs used are robust against these attacks and can keep up with the traffic load.
However, even an idealized model can help uncover design flaws, and find improvements to the network configuration. Formalizing network behavior can help make systems more secure, by identifying potential weaknesses in the configuration. It can also be used to minimize the allowed services and connections, while still maintaining needed functionality, making the system less vulnerable to novel exploits and attacks [20] . Redundancy can increase the robustness of a network, but also presents difficulties for network intrusion detection. For instance, if a server has multiple network interfaces for failover or load balancing, attack packets may reach a target through multiple paths. By considering connectivity, firewall configuration, and NIDS placement, we can ensure that these packets are detected.
Outline: Section 2 presents the basic framework and definitions. Section 3 briefly describes the implementation, and a simple example of checking a network that includes NIDSs and filtering. Section 4 presents our main contribution, describing applications to different aspects of network configuration, including ruleset and false alarm reduction, checking firewalls, and automatically generating NIDS configurations. Sections 5 and 6 present related work and conclusions.
PRELIMINARIES
Network Graph: Our formal network description language is based on that of Guttman [12] . It is expressive enough to describe interesting properties of network configurations, but simple enough to support efficient and automatic reasoning. We model a network as a directed graph, where packets travel from node to node. A useful special case is to model the network as a bipartite graph, where nodes are either routers or areas, and each edge connects a router and an area; but our tool can also handle the general case. Firewalls are modelled at the router nodes, which can filter the traffic that goes through them. Figure 1 shows an example corporate network graph, based on that of [12, 13] . (In the figure, each edge represents two directed edges, one in each direction.) It contains five routers and six areas, and a designated host protected by a host-based firewall, such as an Autonomic Distributed Firewall (ADF) [1] . Each router has a different network interface for each area to which it is connected. Areas contain disjoint sets of hosts, which can be the source or destination of individual packets. In this model, individual hosts are not themselves nodes in the graph, but their addresses are used to constrain the packets that can flow from one area to another. If a particular host includes its own firewall, as in the case of ADFs, then it can be given its own area, as is the case for the host home in Figure 1 .
Host Sets: Our tool uses either numeric IP addresses or symbolic host names. Sets of addresses are expressed using constraints. For instance, the hosts in engineering can be represented as [129,42,2,*], or, if the more abstract representation is chosen, as an abstract set of three hosts, [eng_mail_server,db_server,eng_untrusted_host].
Given the hosts in each area, new host sets can be symbolically defined with the usual operations on these finite sets. For this example, we have defhostset(internal,union(engineering,finance)). defhostset(corporate,union(periphery,internal)). defhostset(non_corporate,complement(corporate)). defhostset(mail_hosts, [eng_mail_server,fin_mail_server] Packets: A packet p is a structure with a fixed set of fields, including source and destination ports and IP addresses, type, orientation, and payload. If nonsymbolic IPv4 addresses are used, each address field is split into four segments, each constrained to the range 0..255. Following [12] , an oriented service is one of from server or to server together with a service type S, one of a finite set of services, in our case, {ftp, telnet, http, smtp, db service}. Oriented services capture the ability of firewalls and NIDSs to distinguish between client and server for certain traffic, depending on who initiated the connection. Our tool assumes that the payload field is abstracted to match the IDS capabilities. In the simplest case, which we use in our examples, this is a finite-domain datatype where, for example, a particular smtp attack recognized by the IDS has payload smtp_attack_payload. Supporting more expressive payload descriptions, such as the regular expressions used by the Snort IDS [19] , is left for future work.
A packet language L is a set of packets. It is important to note that packet languages describe the sources that packets purport to have, regardless of whether they have been spoofed. We will often represent languages as a constrained packet structure, of the form where each field is associated with a finite-domain constraint. Thus, R represents the set
The class of packet languages that can be expressed in this way is closed under intersection:
We use lists of constrained packets for closure under union and complementation. (If no other rules are present, we use firewall semantics that deny any packet that is not explicitly allowed.) In the nonsymbolic formulation, the type field ranges over {tcp, udp, icmp}, and service types, such as http, are identified by their port numbers. Services with variable ports, such as ftp, can be given their own abstract type field.
Path Filtering, Trajectories, Policies and Events: For a path P : e1, . . . , en , the set of packets that can traverse
A trajectory is a pair L, P for a nonempty packet language L and a path P . The trajectory is feasible if L ⊆ packets(P ). For area sets S1 and S2, we write paths(S1, S2) for the set of noncyclic paths that start at a node in S1 and end in S2. For areas a1, a2, we write paths(a1, a2) for paths({a1} , {a2}). For host sets H1 and H2,
For a path P and node n, we write n ∈ P if n appears in P . A policy Pol is a map from area pairs to packet languages. For areas a1 and a2, the language Pol(a1, a2) is the set of packets that Pol allows from a1 to a2. Pol states that (1) the allowed packets can indeed travel from a1 to a2, and (2) no other packets can; thus, Pol holds iff
An event is a triple (H1, H2, L), for host sets H1 and H2, and packet language L. Informally, it describes a packet in L that travels from a host in H1 to one in H2. For an event E : (H1, H2, L), the set of feasible trajectories is
NIDS Configuration and Detection Policies
We use a simple NIDS model, where an NIDS configuration is given by its location in the network, and the set of packets that cause it to raise an alert. This is sufficient to describe most behavior of signature-based network IDSs [19, 17] . However, the utility of our framework is not limited to such NIDSs. If the traffic that a monitor needs to observe can be specified as events in our framework, then our tool can help correctly place and configure the monitor.
To model correlation, we use a finite set of correlation engines E. When a packet raises an alert, we specify the subset of E to which the alert is sent, defining a mapping correlate : (Ids, Location, P acket) → 2 E . Thus, we use the declaration
where Area is a node in the graph, L is a packet language, and C is a set of correlation engines. If more than one NIDS monitors an area, we can use a single name to represent the combined NIDS detection capability at that area. Since an NIDS may be used to monitor multiple subnets, and different rules used for each, we allow more than one configuration statement for an NIDS. This also lets us specify NIDSs that send different alerts to different correlation engines, depending on the packets involved. We write idsconfig(I, n, L, C) if NIDS I raises alerts at node n for packet language L and correlation set C, which can be empty. Then,
Often, there is at most one NIDS on each node, and we write alerts(n) for alerts(In, n).
An NIDS detection policy is given by an event description, which describes conditions that might indicate an attack and should result in NIDS alerts. In the simplest case, we consider single events, where a packet in a language L leaves area S and arrives at area D:
event:[leaves:S, arrives:D, packets:L]
In our IDS configuration and policy specifications, the packet language L can specify a particular class of attacks, by constraining the payload, in addition to the source, destination and services. Note that S and D constrain the actual beginning and end of the path that the policy is concerned about; the packets in L may have IP addresses for other sources and destinations. (This can be the case if they are spoofed at S, or if they are in transit from other areas.)
For a path P , we define
This is the set of packets guaranteed to raise an alert if they traverse P . A network enforces an NIDS detection policy iff the event specified by the policy always raises an alert. For an event E : (S, D, L), an alert should be raised if any packet in L leaves a host in S and arrives at a host in D. That is, if L ⊆ guaranteedalert(P ) for all L, P ∈ trajectories(E).
IMPLEMENTATION
We have developed a tool that uses the above framework to reason about network filters and NIDSs. For ease of representation, manipulation and propagation of packet constraints, as well as searching through the network graph, we implemented the tool in the ECLIPSE Constraint Logic Programming language [5] , whose syntax we have already used in Section 2.
Given the network graph and the filtering rules, it is straightforward to compute the packet language packets(P ) for any path P . However, it is sometimes useful to adopt a dynamic programming approach, and precompute all the (maximal) trajectories in the graph, of the form packets(P ), P for a path P . To do this, we start out with the empty path, which we define as allowing any packet:
Given the constraints for the paths of length n, we compute the constraints on all paths that extend them by one edge, intersecting their packet language with the filter for the new edge:
The set of packets packets(a1, a2) that can flow from area a1 to area a2 is the union of packets(P ) for all paths P ∈ paths(a1, a2). Note that filters can express routing behavior: particular packets may be allowed to continue only along particular edges.
If we are interested in the possible paths that a particular packet language L can take through the network, we can invoke the same procedure, using L as the initial value of packets( ), rather than any, in the base case above. In this way, we can compute the trajectories for which IDS I will generate an alarm at node N : starting with alerts(I, N ), compute all feasible paths, and then choose the ones that contain N .
From the point of view of individual nodes n in the graph, we are computing the set of packets reach(n) that can reach it, as a fixpoint:
The notion of policy enforcement can be adapted if particular areas or hosts can be trusted to do no spoofing [12] , or, in general, if particular areas can be trusted to generate only particular types of packets. (One way to achieve this is to equip them with nonbypassable ADFs.) The set of packets O(a) that can originate at area a is defined as any if a is untrusted, and {P | source(P ) ∈ a} otherwise. The packets that can reach a are now packets(a , a) ) .
The set contents(a) of packets that can be found at area a is then contents(a)
Checking Event Detection: We check that E : (H1, H2, L) raises an alert by (1) computing trajectories(E), which represents all the paths that a packet in L might take from a host in H1 to a host in H2, and (2) checking that L ⊆ guaranteedalert(P ) for each L , P ∈ trajectories(E). The trajectories can be obtained by computing L ∩ packets(P ) for each P ∈ paths(H1, H2), or by the dynamic programming algorithm above, with L as the initial language in the base case.
Reading Configuration Files: Our tool constructs a representation of the packet language allowed by a sequence of Cisco PIX firewall rules by processing them in order. When processing rule ri, the packets that match rules r1, . . . , ri−1 are excluded. Our implementation can handle medium-size real-world PIX configuration files, with up to 130 rules, in under one minute. A more compact packet representation, such as ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) [3] , may be needed to read larger ones, as done in [13] .
Our prototype implementation is highly efficient for small networks. For our running example of Figure 1 , the filtering posture and policies are defined, evaluated, and all feasible paths computed, in less than 0.1 second on a standard desktop machine, when symbolic addresses are used. When actual IP addresses and firewall rules are used, the time is less than 20 seconds, with most of the time spent processing the input rules. Algorithms that compute feasible paths only on an on-demand basis will be needed for larger, highly connected networks, where the number of feasible paths through the network can be exponential in the number of nodes.
We are working on automatically processing Snort [19] NIDS specifications as well, using similar techniques. In this case, the packet payload matches should be abstracted to a finite datatype that captures the main classes of packets that the NIDS must monitor.
Example: Analyzing Network Flow: Consider a potential http attack from external to a Web server in finance. Given a standard firewall configuration, our tool can determine that this event cannot occur: the two possible paths, through periphery and engineering, are blocked for http packets from external to finance.
On the other hand, the tool can be used to check that events expressing desired functionality can indeed occur, by verifying that these "good" events have a nonempty set of trajectories. In addition, the number of trajectories gives a measure of redundancy for the allowed events.
Example: Checking NIDS Configuration
To illustrate the basic concepts of NIDS specification and configuration in our framework, consider a detection policy for attacks that exploit smtp vulnerabilities, from outside corporate to engineering.
As Figure 1 shows, we assume that the three corporate areas, namely, engineering, finance, and periphery, correspond to three subnets that can each be monitored by an NIDS. (If these areas consist of multiple network segments, one can decompose them into subareas so that each is monitored by a separate NIDS.)
First, we define a packet language for a general version of the attack:
[source:any, dest:any, service:smtp, orientation:any, payload:smtp_attack_payload]).
This definition is evaluated to a constrained packet structure that describes all smtp_attack packets. The NIDS detection policy states that if such a packet departs a noncorporate host, and arrives at engineering, an alarm should be raised:
define_detection_policy(detect_smtp, [leaves:non_corporate, arrives:engineering, packets: smtp_attack]).
The NIDS configuration specifies the location and the packets for which it raises an alert:
define_ids_config(candidate_ids, [location: periphery, packets: smtp_attack]).
In this case, the NIDS is deployed on the periphery, and is meant to detect smtp attacks against engineering hosts. However, this configuration does not cover the attack path from allied to engineering. Indeed, when we ask our tool to check configuration candidate_ids against policy detect_smtp, the following output is produced: When the location of the NIDS is moved from periphery to engineering, our tool reports that there is no violation of policy detect_smtp.
APPLICATIONS: CONFIGURING NIDS AND FIREWALLS
We already saw how our tool can help with NIDS placement in Section 3. We now describe how it can be used to analyze and improve various other aspects of filtering and NIDS configuration.
NIDS Ruleset Reduction and Checking Firewalls at Runtime
If an NIDS cannot keep up with the network traffic, it may miss attacks. The resources required usually depend on the nature and number of rules activated, so one way to improve NIDS throughput is to reduce the set of rules. The challenge is to do this without missing events that violate the network security policy.
If we assume that the firewalls will work as specified, we can first use our tool to compute contents(A) for the area A where an NIDS I is deployed, and then remove from its configuration at A any rule whose domain is disjoint from this set.
On the other hand, if some firewalls are not trusted, we can generate an NIDS specification that checks for any violation of the firewall specification. To check a set of firewalls S in a network N , first create a network description N that does not include the filters from S. Then compute reach N (n) for the node n where the NIDS will be placed. The new IDS is configured to raise an alert if any packet in reach N (n) − reachN (n) is observed at n.
False Alarm Reduction
NIDS false alarms have two main sources: (1) inaccurate attack models, and (2) network misconfiguration. An example of the first is an attack signature with a small footprint of a buffer overflow that also matches normal system activities. An example of network misconfiguration is an incorrectly located NIDS that generates alerts for traffic that it is not designed to monitor. For example, a company may deploy a heuristic looking for the string "Unpublished source code of Company X" in packet payloads, to detect unauthorized transfer of proprietary source code. If an NIDS with this detection heuristic monitors the network used by a software engineer to access the source code repository, it will generate a large number of false alarms.
Given the network configuration and the normal activities that the network must support, we can automatically detect misconfiguration. For example, we can identify false alarms by considering all possible network paths used by authorized employees to access the repository, and the NIDSs that monitor a node in these paths.
Algorithm:
We can identify the NIDSs that generate an alert for a given event E by checking, for each T : L, P ∈ trajectories(E), whether L ∩ alerts(N ) = ∅ for each N ∈ P . To identify possible false alarms, we do this for normal events, which describe desired network functionality.
Generating NIDS Configurations from Event Specifications
We can go further and generate an NIDS specification from a description of attacks and normal events. Assume that as input we are given a fixed filtering posture, a set of attack events E bad , and a set of normal events, E good . The goal is to find an NIDS configuration that generates alerts for all the events in E bad , but does not raise alerts for events in E good , since these would be false alarms. We first generate the corresponding sets of good and bad trajectories:
For a node n, we define L good (n) (resp. L bad (n)) as the set of packets that pass through n while traversing a trajectory for a good (resp. bad) event:
Let O be the set of observable nodes, where we can place an NIDS. Consider the configuration that places an NIDS In at every observable node n, such that
(If this set is empty, no NIDS is placed at n.) It is clear that this configuration will not raise false alerts for the good events. Furthermore, among the set of such configurations, it is the one that will raise the most alerts for the bad events. Therefore, a solution exists iff this configuration works, that is, if for all T : L, P ∈ T bad , L ⊆ guaranteedalert(P ) .
While the above construction finds a solution if one exists, it may be suboptimal: the NIDSs are likely to be redundant, checking for the same packets multiple times along the same path. As with the filtering posture generation in [12] , the NIDS configuration problem becomes more openended when different notions of optimality are considered. We can take a more incremental approach, tightening different NIDS nodes until we succeed or no further tightening is possible.
In general, a redundancy-free configuration does not always exist. But a second procedure to generate NIDS configurations that results in fewer redundancies follows:
Initially, let alerts(In, n) = ∅ for all nodes n. We say that a node n is saturated if alerts(In, n) = L bad (n) − L good (n). Let the initial set Q of pending trajectories be T bad . Loop: If Q is empty, stop; else
Remove from Q all trajectories T : L bad , P such that L bad ⊆ guaranteedalert(P ). Find a T : L bad , P ∈ Q such that P contains an unsaturated observable node n; If there is no such T , stop; else Add L bad − L good (n) to alerts(In, n), goto Loop.
If Q is empty at the end of this procedure, we have found a suitable NIDS configuration. Otherwise, no such configuration exists, and the trajectories in Q describe overlaps between T good and T bad that cannot be resolved. For each remaining trajectory L bad , P , the problematic set will be
A human designer might be able to inspect these and decide whether the filtering posture should be adjusted, or the topology changed, to meet the desired specification.
Generating Optimal NIDS Configurations
Many different NIDS configurations can enforce a given detection goal. Given a cost function, our tool can generate an optimal NIDS configuration, searching through all possible correct configurations to find one with a minimal cost.
This has various applications, depending on how the cost function is defined. For example, an NIDS must be able to keep up with the traffic at the node where it is placed. Given a choice, we may prefer placing NIDSs at nodes with lower bandwidth, which will reduce the chances of dropped packets. For similar reasons, we may want to keep the number of rules at each NIDS to a minimum. The cost of placing an NIDS I at a node n can then be defined as a function of the number of rules in I and the bandwidth at node n.
For many cost functions, the cost of a partial configuration is a lower bound for the total cost. The Constraint Logic Programming approach makes it easy to implement a branch-and-bound strategy to search for an optimal configuration. Here, the algorithm of Section 4.3 is used to generate candidate configurations; partial configurations are discarded as soon as their cost exceeds that of a known solution. We have implemented this within our tool.
The case where both NIDS and firewall rules are generated simultaneously is left for future work (see Section 6).
Detecting Multistep Attacks
A complex attack may involve multiple steps. In attack scenario recognition for multistep attacks, e.g. [6] , the detection process is divided into two parts: First, the individual attack steps are detected by NIDSs, which send alerts to a correlation engine. The correlation engine then performs some inference on these alerts to detect multistep attacks.
For example, assume that an adversary in the external area plans to obtain proprietary source code stored in the engineering area. To circumvent the network access control policy enforced by the firewalls and the likely detection policy for source code transfers to an external host, the adversary uses a three-step attack:
• (1) exploit a vulnerability in an email server in the corporate area;
• (2) use the compromised email server to obtain the source code from the repository in engineering; and
• (3) encrypt the source code and email it to a host in external.
Attack steps such as (3) may not be observable by an NIDS. Still, we want the critical observable steps to be detected by one or more NIDSs that report their alerts to the same correlation engine, which may recognize the scenario from these alerts.
To specify multistep attacks, our detection policies can specify (unordered) event sets, in addition to single events. For example, the following policy states that an alarm should be raised if an email attack against a corporate mail host, and a source code transfer to a mail host, both occur: To enforce this detection policy, we may configure NIDSs at finance and engineering to detect attacks against corporate mail hosts and source code transfers to them. Moreover, these NIDSs will send alerts to the same correlation engine.
Correlation Check Algorithm: We do not model the correlation specifics, limiting ourselves to checking that a correlation engine will always receive a sufficient set of alerts.
To do this for a multistep attack E consisting of events {E1, . . . , En}, we check if there is a correlation engine that will receive an alert for any feasible trajectory of each event.
Let Cset be the set of correlation engines in the system. Define:
guaranteedalert(P, C) def = {L | idsconf ig(I, N, L, CS) and N ∈ P and C ∈ CS} .
Given a network configuration, the following algorithm quickly checks that some correlation engine Ci will receive the alerts necessary to detect a multistep attack E : {E1, . . . , En}:
This is a sound, but incomplete test: If the above code terminates without reporting that E is detected by some Ci, then there may be an assignment of trajectories to events E1, . . . , En such that no correlation engine detects all of them. This, however, is not always the case: Consider a multistep attack with events E : {E0, E1}, where E0 has a single trajectory T0, and E1 has two possible trajectories {T1, T2}. Consider correlation engines C1, C2, such that C1 detects {T0, T1} and C2 detects {T0, T2}. Then the multi-step attack E is always detected by either C1 or C2, though neither correlation engine is guaranteed to always do so.
Finding Attacks that Evade Correlation: If the above algorithm does not find a correlation engine for E, we can run a more expensive test to try to find an instance of the multistep attack that goes undetected.
Since each NIDS declaration along a trajectory can generate a different set of alerts, each sent to different correlation engines, we cannot take the union of the alert packets along each path P , as guaranteedalert(P ) does for the single-event case (see Section 2). For a packet p ∈ packets(P ), the set of correlation engines that will receive alerts when packet p traverses path P is c alerts(p)
A trajectory L, P partitions L into (disjoint) equivalence classes L1, . . . , Ln, defined by a common value of c alerts(p). These classes can be computed by enumerating the subsets S of NIDS declarations for nodes in P , such that
is nonempty. This maps each trajectory to a set of "subtrajectories" { Li, P }. For each assignment of subtrajectories {T1, . . . , Tn} to events {E1, . . . , En}, we check that the corresponding alert sets have a common correlation engine, that is,
This is the set of correlation engines that will raise an alert for that choice of subtrajectories. If empty, the chosen subtrajectories describe an instance of the multistep attack that can go undetected.
Packet Transformations
Our framework so far assumes that packets are not modified as they traverse the network. This assumption no longer holds when some modern networking techniques are used. Techniques such as network address translation, port mapping, and IPsec mean that the source, destination, ports, and payloads of packets can change as they move from one node to the next.
To accommodate this, we can extend our framework to include the history of the packets as part of each trajectory. Instead of being a pair T : L, P , a trajectory T is now of the form
where each Li describes the packets at node ni.
The notion of event can now distinguish the packet at the source from the packet that arrived at the destination. In the case of attacks and confidentiality violations, we can let the initial and ending packet be arbitrarily different from each other. For example, we can then specify security policies that are violated if a confidential packet P originating in a protected location ends up as a packet P in an unprotected one; conversely, if a packet P that originates at an untrusted location, causes a derived packet P to arrive at a sensitive one.
The algorithms we have presented can be adapted in a straightforward way. In practice, the main new task that must be performed by the tool is to compute the post-image of a packet language L as it passes a node n: Consider a node n that performs NAT, port mapping, or encryption; let fn describe this transformation, where a packet p is transformed to fn(p). We must then compute
If the mappings are relatively uniform, as they often are (e.g. translating a block of private addresses to a public address and port), this can be efficiently computed as a transformation on constraints.
RELATED WORK
Our work differs from [12] in that we represent and reason about NIDS specifications. Our implementation makes it easier to extend the constraints for packet languages, so they can include features other than source, destination, and services, such as payload. Also, although our running example is a bipartite graph, our implementation is not limited to this case. The work in [12] is extended in [13] , to include IPsec authentication and confidentiality, which we address in more limited ways. Directed interfaces split router nodes and use directed edges to capture more detail about router processing.
A number of firewall management tools, such as Firmato [2] , Fang [16] , and Lumeta [21] , can specify an abstract network access control policy, and check or generate firewall rules that satisfy the policy. A distributed firewall architecture based on Autonomic Distributed Firewalls (ADFs) is presented in [15] . ADFs (e.g. [1] ) have several advantages over conventional firewalls relevant to enforcing network security policies, particularly nonbypassability, and can prevent spoofing. Section 3 shows how our framework can model the spoofing prevention feature of ADFs, and perform a more accurate analysis.
IPsec policies are automatically generated in [10] by identifying areas and paths that require encryption. In [14] , the KeyNote trust management system is used for distributed firewall configuration, including IPsec as well. Policy validation is used in [4] as the basis for adaptive network reconfiguration, to enforce a security policy in a dynamic environment.
An expert system to analyze firewall configurations that is also implemented in the ECLIPSE Constraint Logic Programming language is presented in [9] . This tool can also read Cisco router access tables, and answer basic questions about connectivity, spoofing, and access permissions, which helps find problems in network configurations. Our tool performs similar reasoning; in addition, we reason about NIDS specifications, and generate NIDS configurations.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents an integrated, constraint-based approach for modeling and reasoning about the two main types of network security components, namely NIDS and firewalls. Based on this approach, we have developed a tool that can process Cisco PIX firewall rules, and analyze abstract NIDS configurations to determine whether a detection policy is enforced. As discussed in Section 4, our approach provides a rigorous yet lightweight tool to help a security administrator address a variety of network configuration problems.
The work presented in this paper can be extended in several directions. The algorithm for deriving NIDS configurations can be combined with the firewall policy generation procedures of [12] if unresolvable good and bad trajectories remain (see Section 4.3). Our model does not consider the order of events in a multistage attack. A more advanced model could. This is particularly relevant if the network can be reconfigured to respond to an ongoing attack, as done, for example, by the self-securing network interfaces of [11] .
If the NIDSs or the filtering rules are reconfigured at runtime, our tools can always be used to automatically check each new configuration. (Note that this is not always necessary: for example, possible changes in routing behavior may be modeled statically simply by underspecifying the set of edges that certain packets can traverse when they leave a node.) However, this does not guarantee that the network will always be correctly configured. To do this, it may be possible to model the evolution of the network as a transition system, and formulate its correctness as a temporal verification problem, to which model checking [8] can be applied.
